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Abstract The main goal of a personalized recommender
system is to provide useful recommendations on various
items to the users. In order to generate recommendations,
the service needs to access various types of user data such
as previous product purchasing history, demographic and
biographical information. However, users are sensitive to
disclosure of personal information as it can be easily
misused by malicious third parties. Consequently, there are
unavoidable security concerns which will become known
through attempted unauthorized access while providing the
recommendation services. In order to protect against
breaches of personal information, it is necessary to obfus-
cate the user information by means of an efficient
encryption technique while simultaneously generating the
recommendation by making true information inaccessible
to the system. To address these challenges, we propose a
privacy-preserving recommender system using homomor-
phic encryption, by which the system can provide recom-
mendations without knowing the actual ratings. Our
approach is based on the ElGamal cryptosystem by which
both addition and multiplication of plaintexts can be per-
formed. The performance of the proposed scheme shows
significantly high accuracy in-terms of computation and
communication costs as well as outperforming other
existing solutions.
Keywords Data privacy  Recommender systems 
Homomorphic encryption
1 Introduction
Recommender systems [1] provide meaningful and useful
recommendations to users by making use of explicit and
implicit information about user preferences. Recommen-
dations are also often based on the degree of similarity
between the active user and all other users, or one partic-
ular item that the user has rated and all other items. The
items can be of any type: books, movies, web pages,
restaurants, sightseeing places, online news, and even
lifestyles. By collecting information about users’ prefer-
ences for different items, a recommender system creates
their profiles. These preferences can help the recommender
system to predict other items that might also be of interest
to the user in the future. Content-based filtering (CBF) and
collaborative filtering (CF) are the most commonly used
techniques that generate recommendations for users based
on their preferences. CBF predicts a user’s rating on a
particular item based on the previous ratings and item
features, while CF generates recommendations based on
the previous ratings only. In order to run the process of
recommendations, users’ profiles must be available to the
recommender server (or service providers). Therefore,
there are risks that such information is leaked to malicious
parties which can lead to severe damage to the user’s pri-
vacy (e.g. exposure or generating false recommendations)
[2]. Figure 1 shows the general architecture of a conven-
tional recommender system and possible ways in which
privacy breaches can occur. It is thus crucial to adequately
protect privacy of information managed by recommender
systems. Existing approaches can be categorized as
follows.
Perturbation In data perturbation methods, noises are
injected to users’ private data before sending the data to the
server for generating recommendations. Zhang et al. [3]
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proposed two data reconstruction methods based on Sin-
gular Value Decomposition and K-means clustering. These
derive original private information from perturbed data in
existing perturbation-based CF schemes. Zhang et al. also
showed that the data perturbation techniques might not be
able to secure the data properly. Another singular value
decomposition (SVD) based on CF with privacy has been
proposed [4] which maintains acceptable accuracy for a
recommendation while protecting the privacy of user
information based on randomized perturbation-based
schemes. A distributed mechanism for users in CF was
proposed [5] by which the users’ profiles were made secure
to untrusted server from accessing the data. Also, a trade-
off between privacy and recommendation accuracy has
been minimized in this technique.
Differential Privacy Little research has been carried out
on differentially private recommender systems which also
consider minimizing the trade-off between security and
recommendation accuracy. A method [6] based on differ-
ential privacy has been proposed where the algorithm has
been factored into two parts: an aggregation/learning phase
that can be performed with differential privacy guarantees,
and an individual recommendation phase that uses the
learned correlations and an individual’s data to provide
personalized recommendations. Another example of a
differential private recommender system was proposed by
Machanavajjhala et al. [7] who presented a graph link-
based recommendation and formalized the trade-off
between privacy and accuracy. Extra noises are induced in
these types of methods.
Homomorphic Encryption The homomorphic encryption
techniques usually adopt cryptography to hide users’ pri-
vate data. Canny [8] proposed a scheme for privacy-pre-
serving CF which reduces the filtering task to an iterative
calculation of the aggregate, requiring only the addition of
vectors of user data using homomorphic encryption tech-
niques. This approach allows sums of encrypted vectors to
be computed without exposing individual rating informa-
tion of users. Another research [9] was conducted by the
same author to protect an individual’s personal data only.
This approach was conducted based on a probabilistic
factor analysis model. Its use was also suggested for dif-
ferent kinds of statistical analyses. Erkin et al. [10] pro-
posed a collaborative filtering-based recommender system
which uses efficient protocols based on homomorphic
encryption and secure multiparty communication. They
also applied the approach in a social trust network [11]
aiming to achieve similar outcomes to previous work
where the additional overhead with regard to computation
and communication is minimized by packing data. Kikuchi
et al. [12] addressed the large overhead in performing the
cryptographic operations which is proportional to the
number of users and items. Therefore, they came up with
reducing the computation and communication costs by
introducing clustering-based CF where users and items are
grouped together based on their similarity. Tada et al. [13]
proved that the cost for generating recommendation can be
reduced by using item-based similarity instead of user-
based. Therefore, the issue with scalability in the recom-
mender system was handled in their proposed work where
privacy was preserved using Paillier cryptosystem.
The main disadvantages of perturbation and differential
privacy-based methods are as follows. Firstly, they suffer
from poor quality in selecting the neighbours (similar users
or items) due to inducing large noise. Secondly, they are
not highly guaranteed in-terms of providing rigorous
security. They also suffer from a trade-off between privacy
and recommendation accuracy. Additionally, the existing
homomorphic-based approaches experience high compu-
tational costs [14].
Our Contributions In this paper, we propose a new
privacy-preserving recommender system, which allows the
computations required for recommendations in a dis-
tributed manner and preserves user privacy without com-
promising recommendation accuracy and efficiency. We
introduce the privacy protocol by ElGamal encryption
which is based on public key cryptosystem. The main
advantage of this cryptosystem is that it is semantically
secure and allows certain types of computations on the
ciphertexts. We assume a semi-trusted server named
‘‘recommender server’’ whose task is to perform the
computations for recommendation on encrypted data. We
propose different privacy protocols for item average and
similarity computations as well as recommendations gen-
erations by which the privacy of users is preserved.
Specifically, our main contributions are:
1. An efficient privacy-preserving item-based recom-
mender system to protect user privacy during recom-
mendation process.
Fig. 1 Traditional recommender system and its possible security
concerns
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2. Privacy-preserving item average and similarity com-
putation protocols to calculate averages and similari-
ties among the items without compromising user
ratings. Moreover, which items have been rated are
also hidden during these processes.
3. Two different types of solutions to generate recom-
mendations securely: CBF and CF-based recommen-
dations.
In summary, our proposed model is able to work as
follows:
• Firstly, all users participate to compute average ratings
of items. Users encrypt their rating as well as flag
information to hide which items are actually rated.
Specifically, users encrypt all ratings including zeros
and send the ciphertexts to the server. The server
computes averages using homomorphic properties and
all users jointly decrypt the results.
• Secondly, to calculate the similarity among the items,
all users locally perform certain computations and
encrypt them. The server computes similarity among
the items securely and allows all users to decrypt the
results without revealing any private information.
• Finally, based on average ratings, similarities and target
user’s encrypted rating information, the ‘‘recommender
server’’ computes recommendation scores homomor-
phically. The target user decrypts these ciphertexts
using own private key and chooses highest recom-
mended item from the results.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In
Sect. 2, we provide some preliminary studies related to
recommender system and ElGamal cryptosystems. Sec-
tion 3 represents the proposed methodology to compute
item average, similarity and recommendation securely. A
numerical example with a small user-item rating matrix has
been provided to explain our proposed model clearly in
Sect. 4. Sections 5 and 6, respectively, represent the
security and performance analysis of our proposed model.
The last section presents a conclusion to the overall study.
2 Preliminaries
There are two basic entities that drive a recommender system:
users who use the recommender system to provide opinions
as well as receive recommendations and items that are rated
by users. The inputs to a recommender system are usually
arithmetic rating values, which express the users’ opinions of
items and follow a specified numerical scale (example: 1: bad
to 5: excellent). The outputs of a recommender system can be
either predictions or recommendations.
Let U ¼ u1; u2; . . .; un be the set of all n users in a
recommender system and I ¼ i1; i2; . . .; im be the set of
items where m is the total number of items. Let R be a
rating matrix where ri;j is a rating provided by user ui on
item ij. Usually, the rating matrix is sparse because of
missing values as it is not possible to rate all items nomi-
nated by all users in a system. The missing rating is
denoted by ri;j ¼ 0. Hence, the primary goal of a recom-
mender system is to predict the rating for a user ui on item
ij which the user has not previously rated.
2.1 Similarity Calculation
To generate recommendations, one of the key steps is to
calculate similarities/correlations among the item pairs.
Cosine similarity is one of the commonly adopted simi-
larity measures to determine the nearest neighbour in rec-
ommendation generation. Recalling the notations





r21;j þ    þ r2n;j
q ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
r21;k þ    þ r2n;k
q ð1Þ
where ij and ik represent two individual items. ri;j and ri;k
represent the ratings provided by the user ui on those two
items and n represents the total number of users.
2.2 Recommendation Generation
Depending on different scenarios, the types of recom-
mendations for users may vary. In our model, we consider
two types of recommendations, by which the solutions
represent determining recommendation scores for all items
and based on these scores target user is able to choose the
most suitable item for him.
2.2.1 CBF-Based Recommendations
In CBF, the recommendations are generated based on the
items’ features. The process is to check for similarity
among the items which is calculated using item features
first, and then, based on those similarity, the CBF generates
recommendations for the target user. The equation for
predicting the recommendation using CBF is:
Pi;k ¼
Pm
j¼1 ri;j  sðij; ikÞPm
j¼1 sðij; ikÞ
ð2Þ
where Pi;k denotes the rating prediction for user ui. k ¼
f1; 2; . . .;mg is the number of items that the target user has
requested for the recommendation. ri;j and sðij; ikÞ denote
the rating vector of user ui and similarity between item ij
and ik respectively. Please note that in our proposed model
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we use user ratings instead of item features to calculate
similarity among the items.
2.2.2 CF-Based Recommendations
Unlike the CBF, the CF-based algorithm generates rec-
ommendations based on item ratings. CF also works in two
steps: first calculating similarity among the items based on
their ratings and then predicting new ratings for the items.
Given similarities among the items, the item-based CF




j¼1 sðik; ijÞ þ
Pm
j¼1ðri;j  RjÞ  sðik; ijÞPm
j¼1 sðik; ijÞ
ð3Þ
where Pi;k denotes the prediction for user ui on item ik. ri;j
and sðik; ijÞ represent the rating provided on item ij by user
ui and the similarity between items ik and ij respectively.
Rk and Rj represent the average ratings of items ik and ij
respectively. Note that the average rating of a particular
item is computed as dividing the total rating by the total
number of users who have actually rated that item.
2.3 Homomorphic Encryption
The ElGamal cryptosystem presented in [15] is additively
and multiplicatively homomorphic. This means that there
exist two operations over the ciphertexts EðM1Þ and EðM2Þ
such that the results of those operations correspond to new
ciphertexts whose decryption yield the sum and multipli-
cation of the plain texts M1 and M2.
EðM1ÞEðM2Þ ¼ EðM1 þM2Þ
EðM1ÞM2 ¼ EðM1 M2Þ
ð4Þ
The ElGamal encryption scheme is a homomorphic and
probabilistic public key encryption based on Diffie–Hell-
man key exchange. The ElGamal encryption scheme can
be defined over any cyclic group G. Its security depends
upon the difficulty of a certain problem in G related to
computing discrete logarithms. The ElGamal encryption
scheme consists of three algorithms: the key generation, the
encryption algorithm, and the decryption algorithm.
Key Generation The private and the public keys are
x 2 Zq and y ¼ gx respectively, where G is a cyclic group
of order q and x ¼ f1; . . .; q 1g.
Encryption A message m is encrypted as follows.
ðC1;C2Þ ¼ ðgr;m  yrÞ ð5Þ
where r is an arbitrary random number chosen by the
encrypter. C1 and C2 are represented as ciphertexts.
Decryption The ciphertexts are decrypted by computing








Homomorphic Property Given two encryptions,
ðC11;C12Þ ¼ gr1 ;m1  yr1ð Þ
ðC21;C22Þ ¼ gr2 ;m2  yr2ð Þ
ð7Þ
the computation of multiplication for two ciphertexts is as
follows:
ðC11;C12ÞðC21;C22Þ ¼ C11C21;C12C22ð Þ
¼ gr1gr2 ; ðm1yr1Þðm2yr2Þð Þ
¼ gr1þr2 ; ðm1m2Þyr1þr2ð Þ
ð8Þ
The resulting ciphertext is the encryption of m1m2 which
is a multiplication of two plaintexts. It has been shown that
ElGamal is semantically secure, i.e. it is computationally
infeasible to distinguish between the encryptions of any
two given messages, if the decisional Diffie–Hellman
problem is intractable [15].
3 Proposed Privacy-Preserving Recommender
System
According to Fig. 2, our proposed scheme is mainly divi-
ded into two phases. Firstly, we provide privacy-preserving
item average computation and privacy-preserving similar-
ity computation as shown in Fig. 2a. Secondly, we repre-
sent privacy-preserving recommendations generation as
shown in Fig. 2b. In the first phase, users encrypt their
ratings and send the ciphertexts to the server. Server
computes the averages as well as similarity among the
items using homomorphic properties and all users collab-
orate to decrypt these ciphertexts. Afterwards, the simi-
larity and averages are stored in server’s database.
According to Fig. 2b, only one user participates to get
recommendations (‘target user’) and sends the ciphertexts
of his item preferences to the server. The server computes
recommendation scores homomorphically and sends the
resultant ciphertexts to the user. The target user finally
decrypts the ciphertexts using own private key. Two types
of secure recommendation scores generation are shown: (1)
CBF-based recommendations and (2) CF-based recom-
mendations. Table 1 shows the mathematical notations and
symbols used in later sections.
3.1 Privacy-Preserving Average and Similarity
Computations
Settings Let a rating matrix shown in Table 2 consists of n
users who have provided ratings on m items where each
user and item are denoted as ui and ij respectively. The
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rating is denoted by ri;j meaning the user ui has given a
rating on item ij. We also assume that there is a secure
channel established between the users and server to
exchange any secret messages securely. To compute
averages and similarity among the items securely, the
server generates a cyclic group G, of large prime order q
with generator g. Each user ui randomly chooses secret key
xi where i ¼ f1; 2; . . .; ng and xi 2 f1; . . .; q 1g. The
public key is calculated by user ui as
yi ¼ gxi ð9Þ
Next, all users send their public keys y1; . . .; yi; . . .; yn to
the server. For n users, the server calculates a common
public key Y and broadcast it to all users to encrypt their
ratings.







Let the users denoted as ui ¼ fu1; u2; . . .; ung have partici-
pated with the server and encrypt their ratings ri;j as well as
Fig. 2 Framework of proposed privacy-preserving recommender
system, divided into two phases: a average and similarity computa-
tion, all users participate and send the ciphertexts of their ratings to
the server. Server performs homomorphic operation to calculate
average and similarity, thereby stores the results in its own database,
b recommendations generation, only one user participates and send
the ciphertexts of own ratings. The server computes the recommen-
dation using homomorphic properties and send the ciphertexts to the







y Individual public key
Y Common public key
x Individual secret key
ri;j Rating given by user ui on item ij




n Total number of users
m Total number of items
sðij; ikÞ Similarity between item Ij and ik
Ci Decryption




l Size of the message
fi;j Flags of ratings ri;j
Table 2 User-item rating matrix
Users/items i1 i2 . . . . . . . . . . . . im
u1 r1;1 . . . r1;j . . . r1;k . . . r1;m




















un rn;1 . . . rn;j . . . rn;k . . . rn;m
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flags fi;j (1, if there is a rating, 0 otherwise) using common
public key Y. The server computes averages of items
homomorphically, and the results are decrypted by collab-
oration of all users. The detailed steps are described below.
Step 1 For all items, ij ¼ i1; i2. . .; im each user ui encrypts
their ratings and flags as Eðgri;jÞ and Eðgfi;jÞ respectively.
Then, they create the message M1i as shown below, con-
taining ciphertexts of their ratings and flags, which are sent
to the server (note that, all users locally compute gm where
m denotes any message, using ElGamal encryption and gm




where i ¼ f1; 2; . . .; ng. ri;j denotes a rating provided by
user ui on item ij and flag fi;j ¼ 1 if there is any rating
otherwise fi;j ¼ 0.
Step 2 Using homomorphic property, the server com-









where ðA1;j;B1;jÞ and ðA2;j;B2;jÞ denote the ciphertexts of
ratings and flags, respectively. To decrypt these cipher-
texts, server broadcasts A1;j and A2;j to all users by
Mð2Þ ¼ fA1;j;A2;jgðj¼1;2;...;mÞ
Step 3 For all users ui ¼ fu1; u2. . .; un}, they compute as
follows using own private keys and send the following
message to the server.
M
ð3Þ
i ¼ ðA1;jÞxi ; ðA2;jÞxi
 
ðj¼1;2;...;mÞ ð14Þ
Step 4 The server decrypts the ciphertexts from











j ¼ loggC1;j ð17Þ
d
ð2Þ





j denote the sum of ratings and the sum
of 1’s (flags) of item ij respectively. Therefore, the average









Remark 1 Since all users jointly decrypt the sum of rat-
ings for each item as well as the number of users who have
actually rated on that item, the server or any users pose no
threats to any user’s private key, personal ratings and flags.





j and Rj to anyone.




























r1;jþþrn;j  ðy1  . . .  ynÞr1þþrn
ðgr1þþrnÞx1þþxn
¼ g











i¼1 ri;j, the server computes discrete logarithm as
d
ð1Þ






In the same way, we can get
d
ð2Þ










i¼1 fi;j is not large,
therefore computing discrete logarithm is not hard.
3.1.2 Similarity Computation
To calculate similarity among the items sðij; ikÞ where ij
and ik represent two different items, we use cosine simi-
larity measure as shown in Eq. (1). Similar to the average
computation, this protocol is also based on homomorphic
properties of public key cryptosystem. According to the
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protocol each user ui, where i ¼ f1; 2; . . .; ng locally
computes pairwise multiplication ri;j  ri;k and square r2i;j of
their preferences. Then, they encrypt these results using
common public key Y and send them to the server. After-
wards, the server performs similarity computation homo-
morphically and allows all users to decrypt the results. The
detailed steps are described as follows.
Step 1 To calculate the similarity among the items, all
users ui, where ui ¼ u1; u2; . . .; un, locally computes gri;jri;k
and gr
2
i;j , and sends the message M
ð4Þ
i containing these







ðj;k¼1;2;...;m; k jÞ ð22Þ
where i ¼ f1; 2; . . .; ng. ri;j  ri;k and r2i;j represent pairwise
multiplications of two different items’ ratings ij and ik,
square of each individual ratings on each item by user ui.
Step 2 The homomorphic product of the ciphertexts









where j; k ¼ f1; 2; . . .;mg and k j.
The server generates the message Mð5Þ as shown below




Step 3 After receiving the message Mð5Þ, all users ui ¼
fu1; u2; . . .; ung create new messages Mð6Þi as shown below
using their individual private key xi.
M
ð6Þ
i ¼ ðAj;kÞxi ; ðAjÞxi
 
ðj;k¼1;2;...;m; k jÞ ð25Þ
where i ¼ f1; 2; . . .; ng. The message Mð6Þi is sent back to
the server.
Step 4 Once the above message is received by the server,












jk ¼ loggC3;j;k ð28Þ
d
ð4Þ
j ¼ loggC4;j ð29Þ
where j; k ¼ f1; 2; . . .;mg and k j. dð3Þjk and dð4Þj are rep-
resented as decryption of pairwise product and square of
ratings, respectively.
After extracting the plaintexts from above equations, the
server computes the similarity between two items ij and ik




















k is also calculated for item ik.
Thus, the server generates m m item similarity matrix
and stores it in the database. Note that, since the server is
semi-honest, it does not disclose any result from this
computation.










Proof From Eq. (23) the server computes the ciphertexts

















r1;jr1;kþþrn;jrn;k  ðy1  . . .  ynÞr1þþrn
ðgr1þþrnÞx1þþxn
¼ g










To find the result of
Pn
i¼1 ri;j  ri;k, the server computes
discrete logarithm as follows.
d
ð3Þ





ri;j  ri;k h
A Practical Privacy-Preserving Recommender System 167
123








3.2 Proposed Privacy-Preserving Recommendation
Generation
We provide two types of solutions for generating recom-
mendations privately using Content-based Filtering (CBF)
and Collaborative Filtering (CF). Let the target user ui has
requested the list of recommendations for all items and
sends his item preferences to the server. The server gen-
erates ciphertexts of recommendation scores homomor-
phically for all items. The target user finally decrypts these
ciphertexts using own private key xi and thus gets the list of
recommendations for all items.
Settings To generate the recommendations, we assume
there is only one user ui (this could be a new user or from
the set of n users, given that he has provided ratings on
same set of m items) who has requested for recommenda-
tions. The user ui holds the public key yi to encrypt the
ratings and private key xi to decrypt the ciphertexts. The
server holds item–item similarity sðij; ikÞ and averages of
items’ ratings Rj where j ¼ f1; 2; . . .;mg.1
3.2.1 Privacy-Preserving CBF-Based Recommendations
To generate CBF-based recommendations, the protocol is
divided into three main steps. Firstly, the target user
encrypts his personal rating vector and sends the cipher-
texts to server. Secondly, the server performs homomor-
phic operations and encryption to generate the ciphertexts
of numerator and denominator of Eq. (2) (CBF-based
method), respectively. Finally, the user receives these
ciphertexts from server and decrypts them to determine
recommendation scores. The detailed steps are described
below.
Step 1 For all items, where ij ¼ i1; i2; . . .; im, the target
user ui encrypts his ratings
2 using the individual public key
yi and sends the message M
ð7Þ






1. After receiving message M
ð7Þ
i , the server performs
homomorphic operation to generate ciphertexts [nu-





where k ¼ 1; 2; . . .;m.
2. For all items j ¼ f1; 2; . . .;mg the server locally
computes the encryption of
Pm
j¼1 sðik; ijÞ [denominator
of Eq. (2)] using target user ui’s public key yi (recall
that similarity among the items are already stored in
server’s database). Firstly, server locally computes
g
Pm
j¼1 sðik;ijÞ and encrypts them as





The server sends the message Mð8Þ containing these
ciphertexts to user ui as follows.
Mð8Þ ¼ ðA2;k;B2;kÞ; ðA3;k;B3;kÞ
 
k¼1;2;...;m
Step 3 For all k ¼ 1; 2; . . .;m, using target user’s private
key xi, these ciphertexts are decrypted by
C4;k ¼ B2;kðA2;kÞxi ð35Þ
C5;k ¼ B3;kðA3;kÞxi ð36Þ




k ¼ loggC4;k ð37Þ
d
ð7Þ
k ¼ loggC5;k ð38Þ









where Pi;k denotes the predicted recommendation on item
ik where k ¼ 1; 2; . . .;m and the item with highest predic-
tion is finally recommended to the user.





j¼1 ri;jsðk;jÞ and dð7Þk ¼
Pm
j¼1 sðik; ijÞ.
Proof From Eq. (33), the server homomorphically com-
putes the ciphertexts by
1 While in the both recommendation processes. users’ personal
ratings and recommendations are privacy sensitive, the item–item
similarity matrix and averages are commercially valuable to the
server. This information cannot be made public or sent to the user to
generate recommendations since this will affect the service provider’s
business.
2 Target user encrypts 0 s, while there is no rating and each of the
ratings is multiplied by 100 since the similarities and averages are
multiplied by 100 by the server to cope with homomorphic operations
using ElGamal cryptosystem.










Using Eq. (35), user ui decrypts the ciphertexts using his
private key xi as follows.
C4;k ¼ A2;kðB2;kÞxi ¼
g
Pm











To get the value of
Pm




k ¼ loggC4;k ¼ loggg
Pm









3.2.2 Privacy-Preserving CF-Based Recommendations
Similar to the CBF-based recommendation process, the
proposed private CF-based method3 also works in three
main steps, which include sending target user’s encrypted
ratings to server, performing homomorphic operations as
well as encryption by the server and finally, determining
the final recommendations by the target user. The detailed
steps are as follows.
Step 1 For all items ij ¼ i1; i2; . . .; im, the target user ui






Step 2 In this step,4 server computes the ciphertexts of
numerator and denominator of Eq. (3) homomorphically
and sends them to target user.
1. Firstly, the server encrypts Rk 
Pm
j¼1 sðik; ijÞ þPm
j¼1ðri;j  RjÞ  sðik; ijÞ (numerator of Eq. (3)). Before




j¼1 sðik;ijÞ, gRj and encrypts them as
EðgRk 
Pm
j¼1 sðik ;ijÞÞ and EðgRjÞ. Finally, the ciphertexts
of numerator are generated by the server homomor-
phically as










where k ¼ 1; 2; . . .;m.
2. Secondly, to generate the ciphertexts of denominator,
server locally computes g
Pm
j¼1 sðik ;ijÞ and encrypts themby





For all items k ¼ f1; 2; . . .;mg, the server sends message
Mð10Þ containing these ciphertexts to target user ui as follows.
Mð10Þ ¼ fðA4;k;B4;kÞ; ðA5;k;B5;kÞgk¼1;2;...;m ð44Þ
Step 3 The target user ui receives this message and
decrypts the ciphertexts using his own private key xi by
C6;k ¼ B4;kðA4;kÞxi ð45Þ
C7;k ¼ B5;kðA5;kÞxi ð46Þ




k ¼ loggC6;k ð47Þ
d
ð9Þ
k ¼ loggC7;k ð48Þ








where Pi;k denotes the recommendation for user ui on item
ik , where k ¼ f1; 2; . . .;mg. Once the user ui gets the list of
recommendations for all items, he chooses the highest
recommended item for him.
Theorem 4 If the target user and the server follow the
protocol, we have d
ð8Þ
k ¼ Rk 
Pm
j¼1 sðik; ijÞ þ
Pm
j¼1ðri;j
RjÞ sðik; ijÞ and dð9Þk ¼
Pm
j¼1 sðik; ijÞ:
Proof Homomorphically, the server computes the

















The target user ui decrypts the ciphertexts using his own
private key xi as,
3 Note that, unlike the CBF, CF-based method includes one
additional step which is subtracting the item’s average rating from
user’s preference on that item.
4 The server holds average ratings Rj and similarities among the
items sðik; ijÞ.






















To get Rk 
Pm
j¼1 sðik; ijÞ þ
Pm
j¼1ðri;j  RjÞ  sðik; ijÞ, the tar-
get user computes discrete logarithm as
d
ð8Þ











ðri;j  RjÞ  sðik; ijÞ h





Remark 3 The target user may send the indices of items
for which he has not provided any ratings. In this case, the
server does not consider those items while computing the
ciphertexts of recommendations.
3.3 Numerical Examples of Proposed Method
To describe the processes of proposed privacy-preserving
average computation, item–item similarity calculation and
recommendations generation clearly, we provide numerical
examples with small 3 4 matrix shown in Table 3. From
this table, the users and items are represented as ui ¼
fu1; u2; u3g and ij ¼ fi1; i2; i3; i4g respectively. The
numerical values in this matrix are denoted as ratings,
given by the users on different items. Before starting these
processes, the server generates a cyclic group G, of a large
prime order q with generator g. Users ui where i ¼ 1; 2; 3,
randomly choose their secret keys xi, where xi 2
f1; . . .; q 1g and calculate public keys as yi ¼ gxi . In
below, the detailed processes with numerical example are
shown.
3.3.1 Average Computation
In this example, we show how to compute average of user
ratings on item i1, denoted as R1. Firstly, users u1, u2 and u3













Once the server receives these messages of ratings and
flags, it starts to compute products of the ciphertexts (sum
of the ratings in plaintexts) by following.
ðA1;1;B1;1Þ ¼ Eðg3Þ  Eðg0Þ  Eðg2Þ ¼ Eðg5Þ
and products of the ciphertexts of flags as
ðA2;1;B2;1Þ ¼ Eðg1Þ  Eðg0Þ  Eðg1Þ ¼ Eðg2Þ
The server broadcasts the message Mð2Þ containing a por-
tion of the ciphertexts for all items to all users by
Mð2Þ ¼ fA1;1;A2;1g
Users create the message M
ð3Þ




i¼1;2;3 ¼ ðA1;1Þxi ; ðA2;1Þxi
 
where i ¼ 1; 2; 3.








Using discrete logarithm, the plaintexts of ratings and flags
can be determined, respectively, as d
ð1Þ
1 ¼ loggg5 and
d
ð2Þ





Similarly, the averages are calculated for all other items as
R2 ¼ 9
3
¼ 3; R3 ¼ 7
2
¼ 3:5; R4 ¼ 8
2
¼ 4
As ElGamal cryptosystem can not handle fraction number,
the server multiplies every plaintexts by 100. The average
ratings of all items are shown in Table 3.
3.3.2 Similarity Calculation
In this example, we show how to compute similarity
between item i1 and i2 securely. Firstly, all users compute
product of pairwise ratings and square of each individual
rating locally, thereby encrypt the results. For instance, all
Table 3 Rating matrix
ui=ij i1 i2 i3 i4
u1 3 5 0 4
u2 0 1 5 0
u3 2 3 2 4
Rj 2.5 3 3.5 4
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users send the message M
ð4Þ
i containing the ciphertexts for
















Once these ciphertexts are received by the server, it com-
putes new ciphertexts of similarity between item i1 and i2
homomorphically as
ðA1;2;B1;2Þ ¼ Eðg3:5Þ  Eðg0:1Þ  Eðg2:3Þ ¼ Eðg21Þ
ðA1;B1Þ ¼ Eðg32Þ  Eðg02Þ  Eðg22Þ ¼ Eðg13Þ
ðA2;B2Þ ¼ Eðg52Þ  Eðg12Þ  Eðg32Þ ¼ Eðg35Þ
where ðA1;2;B1;2Þ represent the numerator and, ðA1;B1Þ and
ðA2;B2Þ represent denominator of Eq. (1) (similarity cal-
culation). Similarly, the server computes similarities
between other pairs of items and sends a portion of these
ciphertexts to all users as
Mð5Þ ¼ A1;2;A1;A2
 
All users collaborate to decrypt the ciphertexts send the
message M
ð6Þ
i to server by
M
ð6Þ
i¼1;2;3 ¼ ðA1;2Þxi ; ðA1Þxi ; ðA2Þxi
 
where xi represents private key of each user and i ¼ 1; 2; 3.
The server decrypts above ciphertexts of similarities
between item i1 and i2 as
C3;1;2 ¼ B1;2Q3
i¼1 A1;2
 xi ¼ g21
C3;1 ¼ B1Q3
i¼1 A1
 xi ¼ g13
C3;2 ¼ B2Q3
i¼1 A2
 xi ¼ g35
Using discrete logarithm, the final results are derived as,
d
ð3Þ
1;2 ¼ loggg21 ¼ 21, dð4Þ1 ¼ loggg13 ¼ 13 and
d
ð5Þ
2 ¼ loggg35 ¼ 35. Finally, the similarity between items
i1 and i2 is computed by the server as follows.
sði1; i2Þ ¼ 21ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
13
p  ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ35p ¼ 0:99
Thus, the similarities among other items are calculated, and
the resultant matrix is stored by the server. The range of the
similarity between two items is 1 to 1, where they denote
most dissimilarity and most similarity, respectively. The
similarities among all items are shown in Table 4, where
each similarity is multiplied by 100 to cope with homo-
morphic properties of ElGamal encryption.
3.3.3 Recommendation Generation
We assume that the target user has requested for recom-
mendations over all items and sent his encrypted ratings to
the server (user multiplies his rating with 100 before send-
ing the ciphertexts of ratings). In both types of recommen-
dations, the server generates two different ciphertexts
separately [numerator and denominator of Eqs. (2) and (3)]
and repeats the process for all items. Finally, the target user
decrypts the results and chooses the item with highest rec-
ommendation score. The solutions to generate recommen-
dations securely are described numerically in below.
CBF-Based Recommendation
For instance, we show the process of private CBF-based
recommendation generation for user u2 on item i1. Firstly,
user u2 sends the message M
ð7Þ
2 containing the ciphertexts





The server homomorphically computes the ciphertexts
[numerator and denominator of Eq. (2), respectively] as
ðA2;1;B2;1Þ ¼ Eðg100Þsði1;i2Þ  Eðg500Þsði1;i3Þ  Eðg0Þsimði1;i4Þ
¼ Eðg100Þ99  Eðg500Þ20  Eðg0Þ98 ¼ Eðg19;900Þ
ðA3;1;B3;1Þ ¼ E gsði1;i2Þþsði1;i3Þþsði1;i4Þ
 
¼ Eðg99þ20þ98Þ ¼ Eðg217Þ
Server sends the message Mð8Þ of these ciphertexts to target
user u2 by
Mð8Þ ¼ ðA2;k;B2;kÞ; ðA3;k;B3;kÞ
 
User u2 locally decrypts the results using his own private





Using discrete logarithm user u2 locally retrieve the
exponent of decryption results as
Table 4 Similarity among the
items
i1 i2 i3 i4
i1 100 99 20 98
i2 100 35 95
i3 100 26
i4 100




1 ¼ loggg19;900 ¼ 19;900
d
ð7Þ
1 ¼ loggg217 ¼ 217




Similarly, the predictions for all other items are calculated
as P2;2 ¼ 0:76, P2;3 ¼ 0:43 and P2;4 ¼ 1:08. Since item i4
achieves highest score, it is recommended for user u2. The
final recommendations results are divided by 100 since the
user ratings, similarities and averages were multiplied by
100 to cope with the ElGamal cryptosystem.
CF-Based Recommendations
Similar to the CBF, in CF-based recommendations the
server generates two different ciphertexts for target user
[numerator and denominator of Eq. (3)]. Let the server is
generating recommendation for user u1 on item i1. The
detailed numerical example is described as follows.













Now the server computes the final ciphertexts of numerator
(Sect. 3.2.2, step 2.1) and denominator (Sect. 3.2.2, step
2.2) homomorphically as,
ðA3;1;B3;1Þ ¼ E g250ð99þ20þ98Þ
 
 Eðg500Þ=Eðg300Þ  99
 Eðg0Þ=Eðg350Þ 20ðEðg400Þ=Eðg400ÞÞ98
 
¼ Eðg54;250Þ  Eðg12;800Þ
¼ Eðg67;050Þ
ðA4;1;B4;1Þ ¼ Eðg99þ20þ98Þ ¼ Eðg217Þ
The server sends message Mð10Þ to target user u2 as
Mð10Þ ¼ ðA3;1;B3;1Þ; ðA4;1;B4;1Þ
 
User u1 receives these ciphertexts and decrypts them using
his own secret key x1 by
C6;3 ¼ B3;1ðA3;1Þx1 ¼ g
67;050
C7;3 ¼ B4;1ðA4;1Þx1 ¼ g
217




67;050 ¼ 67;050 and dð9Þ1 ¼ loggg217 ¼ 217.









Similarly, we get the predictions of other items for user u1
as P1;2 ¼ 2:68, P1;3 ¼ 4:48 and P1;4 ¼ 4:67. Since item i4
achieves highest prediction score, it is finally recom-
mended for user u1.
4 Security Discussion
We assume our privacy-preserving recommender system
protocol is based on a semi-trusted recommender server and
multiple users participated in the recommendation system.
The proof that our proposed solutions really fulfil the privacy
requirements consist of three main observations:
1. Security in Average Computation To calculate aver-
ages ratings of each item, users encrypt their ratings
including flags: 1 if there is any ratings, or 0 otherwise
using the common public key Y. Thus, the ratings
including which items have been actually rated are
secure. All users jointly decrypt the ciphertexts of total
ratings and flags [shown in Eqs. (15) and (16)] without
revealing and individual’s ratings. Since the server is
semi-trusted, it does not collude to reveal user ratings.
2. Security in Similarity Calculation Users first locally
compute pairwise products and square of items’
ratings. Then, they encrypt these results using common
public key Y and send to server. Therefore, user ratings
are secured. Once the server receives the ciphertexts, it
homomorphically computes the similarities and allows
all users to jointly decrypt the results [Eqs. (26) and
(27)]. Being semi-trusted, the server does not pose any
threat to user ratings.
3. Security in Recommendations Generation
(a) CBF-Based Recommendations To generate rec-
ommendations in CBF, target user encrypts item
preferences using own public key yi and sends
them to the server. The server homomorphically
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generates ciphertexts of recommendations lever-
aging the item–item similarity, which is already
available to it, thereby sends the ciphertexts to
target user. While generating recommendations,
the similarities among the items are encrypted
using target user’s public key yi. The ciphertexts
are decrypted by the user’s own secret key xi.
Therefore, during this process target user’s
personal ratings and recommendations results
are not revealed and thus secure.
(b) CF-Based Recommendations Similar to the
CBF-based, CF-based process generates recom-
mendations using ciphertexts of user’s ratings
and items’ similarities except one additional
operation: subtracting item’s average from cor-
responding item’s rating. In this case, the item’s
rating is already encrypted by the user and
average is stored in server in plaintexts format.
To overcome this situation, server encrypts the
average rating using target user’s public key yi
and performs this subtraction homomorphically.
Other operations remain same with CBF-based
process. Therefore, user’s ratings as well as the




According to our proposed model, the computation and
communication costs are calculated by reference to the
number of items and users in the systems. Table 5 sum-
marizes the costs to perform average computation, simi-
larity calculation and recommendation generation by users
and server, where n and m represent the number of users
and items, respectively. We assume all users participate to
calculate averages and similarities among the items in the
system and only one user (target user) participates in rec-
ommendation generation. According to our method, we
also assume that users encrypt their ratings and send the
ciphertexts in parallel to the server, thus the computation
cost on user side can be reduced by computing for one user
only (shown in Table 5—average and similarity computa-
tions for user). On the server side, the computation and
communication costs are represented for all users partici-
pating in the system since they depend on collaboration of
all users with server. For the performance measurements
we consider the time required for modular exponentiations
and multiplications only which are denoted as e and mul,
respectively. We also assume that the communication cost
is linear to the number of ciphertexts sent and received. In
our model, the size of one ciphertext is considered as l ¼
1024 bits.
5.2 Performance Analysis
The performance analysis of our proposed model is con-
ducted in two parts. We first analyse our method in-terms
of computation and communication costs which infer the
efficiency in privacy and secondly we analyse the method
in-terms of recommendation accuracy. To conduct the
experiment, we use Java 2 SE 8 platform with OS Win-
dows 7, 64 bit and 3.6 GHz—core i7, 8GB CPU unit. Java
cryptographic-based libraries are also used for our
Table 5 Computation and communication cost of the proposed model
Computations Computation cost Communication cost
User Server User Server






ðeÞ mðm1Þ2 ðn 1ÞðmulÞ þ mðn 1ÞðmulÞ 3 mðm1Þ2 þ m
 





CBF-based recommendation ð2mþ 2ÞðeÞ 2ððm 1ÞðmulÞ þ ðeÞÞ 2ðmþ 2ÞðlÞ bits 2ðmþ 2ÞðlÞ bits
CF-based recommendation 2m(e) 6ðeÞ þ mðmulÞ 2ðmþ 2ÞðlÞ bits 2ðmþ 2ÞðlÞ bits
Table 6 Accuracy
Computations Computation cost Communication cost
User (s) Server (s) User (Mb) Server (Mb)
Average 0.6 2.14 0.15 144.84
Similarity 45.2 107.92 7.7 7.27  103
CBF-based recommendation 0.3 0.001 0.05 0.05
CF-based recommendation 0.3 0.005 0.05 0.05
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experiment. The proposed method is evaluated using
publicly available data provided by GroupLens [16] which
consists of 100,000 ratings, 1982 items provided by 943
users on a scale of 1–5. In our experiments, we choose 200
items and assign 943 users who have rated on those items.
Therefore, the performance analysis of our model consists
of 943 users and 200 items. Once the items’ averages and
similarities are calculated, one user (‘‘target user’’) is ran-
domly assigned for recommendations generation.
5.2.1 Computation and Communication Costs
The implementation of our proposed method is able to
compute one modular exponentiation (e) and multiplication
(mul) in 7:5 104 and 5:7 106 s, respectively. Table 6
shows performance results (in seconds) required to perform
each individual computation and amount of data that
exchanged between users and the server. From this table it
is clear that the performance of our proposed method is
Fig. 3 Computational cost of
average calculation
Fig. 4 Computational cost of
similarity calculation
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efficient and cost-effective in-terms of both computation
and communication.
Figure 3 shows computational time in-terms of average
calculation. The results in this figure demonstrate that, our
proposed privacy-preserving average computation takes
only 2.7 s to calculate averages of 200 items where the
number of users is 943. This confirms high efficiency in-
terms of average computation. Figure 4 represents com-
putational cost for similarity computations. Figure 5 shows
the computation time in-terms of CBF and CF-based
recommendations together where both methods are highly
efficient and take almost equal time to generate recom-
mendations (0.3 s for 200 items). From these analyses, we
can notice that the similarity calculation takes higher time
compared to other results since this part includes compar-
atively large computations.5 We assume that this
Fig. 5 Computational cost of
recommendation generation
Fig. 6 Comparison in-terms of
total computation cost
5 Note that, the server has to compute the averages and similarities
among the items using all users’ rating information. Since these
computations depends on the number of users participated in the
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computation is done only once at the beginning of rec-
ommendation process. Therefore, the computational cost
for a similarity calculation does not affect the efficiency of
recommendations generation.
The method is compared against three well-known pri-
vacy-preserving collaborative filtering algorithms. The first
method is a randomized perturbation-based method pro-
posed in [17], by which random noises are injected to
users’ ratings to prevent the recommender server from
invading user privacy. Another method is a homomorphic-
based solution by which authors used the Paillier cryp-
tosystem to secure user privacy in user-based CF algorithm
[12]. The last one is also based on Paillier cryptosystem by
same authors where [12] was improved in-terms of com-
putation and communication costs by introducing privacy-
preserving item-based CF algorithm [13]. Figure 6 shows
the comparison with [12, 17] and [13] in-terms of total
computation time required to perform average, similarity
calculation and recommendation generation (we consider
only one type of recommendation; for instance, CF-based
recommendation). Note that, Kikuchi et al. [12] and Tada
et al. [13] introduced public key-based cryptographic pro-
tocol and [17] represented non-cryptographic-based solu-
tions to generate recommendations. Therefore, from Fig. 6
we can observer that although our proposed method is
based on public key-based cryptosystem, it outperforms
other public key-based cryptographic solutions to a great
extent. Moreover, it outperforms the non-cryptographic-
based solution as well, which infers high efficiency by
reducing computation overhead.
5.2.2 Recommendation Accuracy
The proposed method does not have any accuracy loss
during recommendation generation. We carried out the
experiments twice with and without the security protocol to
check if there is any effect in recommendation results. We
found that there is no loss of recommendation accuracy
while the proposed security protocol is added into recom-
mendation process.
6 Conclusion
This paper presents a privacy-preserving recommender
system based on item–item similarity, which can protect
the user profile and rating history from any third parties or
even from other users. Moreover, the server is able to
compute the desired computations for recommendations
without compromising the true rating information. The
experimental results of our proposed model demonstrate
high accuracy in-terms of the computation and communi-
cation costs as well as assuring the privacy, while the
existing works suffer by failing to maintain the balance
between them. Furthermore, the proposed method outper-
forms other cryptographic-based techniques in-terms of
computational cost to generate recommendations. Our
future work includes developing more efficient and secure
recommender system using user-based similarity.
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